From Small Workshops to Global Power: How Iran Built Its Drone Arsenal

How did Iran develop its drone arsenal despite years of crippling US embargoes?

Amidst the persistent geopolitical tensions between the United States, Israel, and Iran, military expert Akram Kharif released his insightful book, In the Shadow of Witness. This publication meticulously explores the origins and evolution of Iran’s burgeoning drone industry.

Kharif’s work elucidates the strategic pathways Tehran adopted, enabling it not only to defy stringent U.S. sanctions but also to emerge as a formidable force in the global military-industrial complex.

Iranian-made drones first surfaced in military reports pertaining to Hezbollah’s activities along the Israeli border. Experts further analyzed the wreckage of Houthi drones in Yemen, linking them unequivocally to Iranian production capabilities.

However, the world was truly taken aback in September 2022 by the revelation that Iran was supplying advanced drone technology to the Russian military. This news coincided with the widespread circulation of the first images of Geranium-2 (Shahed-136) drones soaring through the skies over Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv.

The critical question then became: How could a nation, subjected to over four decades of international embargoes, manage to redefine the dynamics of international conflict? What factors underpinned such an improbable success story?

The relentless series of international sanctions compelled Iran’s post-1979 leadership to explore every available option, seeking ingenious ways to surmount adversities and make strategic decisions to navigate an escalating crisis. This intense pressure also fostered a reliance on its own engineers for technological development, rather than merely political loyalists.

In response to the sanctions, Iran diligently established overseas supply networks to procure components it could not produce domestically, ingeniously leveraging civilian technology whenever possible. Yet, most crucially, amidst severe resource limitations, Iran meticulously crafted and patiently executed a consistent, long-term strategy.

What was Iran’s air defense capability like before the 1979 Revolution?

When Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi departed Iran in January 1979, he bequeathed a military that was, in terms of armament, the strongest in the Middle East region. At that time, the Iranian Air Force was equipped with state-of-the-art fighter jets such as the F-14 Tomcat, F-4 Phantom, and F-5 Tiger.

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During that era, Iran’s military ranked fifth globally in terms of equipment, trailing only the U.S., the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France. The Iranian Air Force, in particular, was considered more advanced than even the air forces of Germany, China, and Israel, primarily due to its possession of the F-14 Tomcat—which was among the most sophisticated fighter aircraft in the world at the time.

However, the operation and maintenance of these advanced systems were heavily reliant on the presence of thousands of American technicians and engineers stationed in Iran. Aircraft spare parts were supplied directly by the American company, Grumman. Thus, the Iranian Air Force was entirely dependent on the American military-industrial complex.

Following the collapse of the Shah’s regime, many military leaders either fled abroad, were killed, or imprisoned. The American technicians and engineers departed, and U.S. companies severed ties with the new regime. Consequently, the aircraft that Iran had purchased for billions of dollars were rendered useless, effectively turning into scrap metal.

What fueled this wave of innovation?

In September 1980, Iraqi forces invaded Iranian territory, igniting an eight-year war between the two nations. This conflict saw the deployment of the most horrific methods of killing and destruction, including chemical weapons, and resulted in an estimated one million casualties.

In the initial phases of the war, Iraqi forces gained significant advantages due to their superior air power. The Iraqi military acquired reconnaissance aircraft from the Soviet Union and obtained satellite imagery, which proved instrumental in tracking enemy positions and monitoring Iranian troop movements.

Conversely, Iranian forces entered the war without a clear strategic vision. They were unable to operate the sophisticated U.S. aircraft inherited from the previous regime, which consequently lay idle. Furthermore, international embargoes prevented them from acquiring the necessary technology to defend their territory.

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Iran desperately needed technology to fight a war that threatened the very survival of the nation. Yet, economic sanctions prevented them from purchasing the required equipment. This dire situation spurred Iran to make a pivotal decision: to create and produce such technology independently, rather than relying on external sources.

The underlying concept was remarkably simple: if manned reconnaissance aircraft couldn’t penetrate enemy lines to ascertain their positions and movements, perhaps smaller, remotely controlled devices could offer a viable solution. These would be cheaper, harder to detect, and capable of providing invaluable intelligence.

The idea of such small devices began to take root in Iran as early as 1981. The concept evolved to include attaching cameras to these aerial platforms. This pioneering initiative originated at Isfahan University, where students and engineers collaboratively worked to bring it to fruition. They meticulously designed, produced, tested, and refined prototypes before ultimately delivering them to the military personnel of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

It all began in a small workshop at Isfahan University

Simple, even primitive, materials—plastic scraps and circuit boards—were combined with sophisticated thinking. A small university workshop became the gathering place for determined young individuals, armed with conviction and belief in the post-revolution Iranian concepts of “jihad of construction” and “university jihad.”

After years of relentless trial and error, marked by both setbacks and unwavering perseverance, three young men began developing designs in the university workshop in Isfahan, eventually conducting field tests in Khuzestan.

Among them was Farshid, a civilian pilot; Saeed, a physics student; and Masoud Zahedi, a professional goldsmith. When they first presented their prototype to military officials, some were openly dismissive, even laughing. The rudimentary device resembled a child’s toy, crafted from unconventional materials. Its fuel tank was a hospital IV bag, and its propellers were painstakingly handmade.

The first combat drone

In the autumn of 1983, approximately 40 kilometers from the front lines, the device once derided as a mere “toy” made its inaugural flight over Iraqi troop positions. It returned with remarkably clear photographs of enemy military locations. Following this pivotal success, an immediate order was issued to establish the “Thunder Battalion” and officially launch a dedicated drone development program.

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The program quickly transitioned from the university workshop at Isfahan into the hands of military commanders within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. To acquire the necessary components for advanced drone development, they were forced to ingeniously circumvent international embargoes against Iran and access global markets through clandestine channels.

The Revolutionary Guard established a network of front companies in Dubai and utilized intermediaries in Singapore to purchase disassembled components from dozens of countries. These vital parts were then shipped to Isfahan for assembly. This complex supply chain explains the discovery of American-made chips in Shahed-136 drones shot down over Ukraine.

Drones proved highly effective in reconnaissance missions, and Iranian forces deployed them in crucial battles against Iraq after 1983. However, by 1987, engineers and military personnel within the Raad Battalion had already begun conceptualizing the development of combat drones.

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A drone capable of flying over enemy positions to record their movements could, in principle, also attack and destroy targets if equipped with weaponry. This, however, demanded different qualifications and technologies—which the Raad Brigade subsequently developed into a combat drone named “Muhajir.”

By 1988, Iran was among the first nations to employ armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), now widely recognized as drones. While the United States, Turkey, and Israel are often cited as leading producers, Iran was, in fact, one of the early pioneers in this field.

In 1988, Iranian drones were still rudimentary in design, with a flight range not exceeding 50 kilometers. Today, however, advanced Iranian-made drones are capable of penetrating the airspace of multiple nations to strike targets in Israel, launched directly from Iranian territory.

Interestingly, Israel—along with the U.S.—was among the very first nations to utilize unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for military objectives. Israel famously employed them in the 1973 war to deceive and deplete Egypt’s air defense missile stockpiles.

This very principle was later meticulously refined and expanded upon by the architects of Iran’s drone program. During Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Tel Aviv deployed Scout and Mastiff drones for reconnaissance missions and to target Syrian missile batteries in the Beqaa Valley. This event marked one of the earliest recorded uses of combat drones in armed conflict.

Reversing existing military paradigms

Iranian experts closely monitored these developments in Lebanon. Their allies in Hezbollah provided crucial assistance in gathering detailed intelligence on Israeli drones. From this information, they concluded that these drones were not prohibitively advanced and that experts at universities in Tehran and Isfahan possessed the capabilities to replicate them.

Numerous military analysts, in various reports, have noted the striking similarities between early Iranian drone models and Israel’s Scout and Mastiff drones. They suggest that Iranian engineers drew significant inspiration from these Israeli designs.

Since the 1970s, a pervasive belief had taken hold in military circles: that weapons incorporating the most advanced technology were inherently the most valuable and effective. The prevailing logic was that one precision-guided missile, hitting its target with pinpoint accuracy from a thousand kilometers away, was superior to hundreds of unguided projectiles. In this equation, technology was believed to triumph over sheer numbers.

However, Iran introduced a revolutionary new concept into this military equation: if it could not compete with its adversaries in technological sophistication, then it would compete in terms of sheer quantity and economic cost. This audacious philosophy became the fundamental cornerstone of Iran’s entire drone program.

A drone with a production cost of approximately US$20,000 simply cannot match the accuracy of a cruise missile priced at US$2 million. But crucially, if 100 such drones are launched simultaneously, the opposing force is compelled to deploy 100—or even more—expensive cruise missiles to intercept them.

Iranian drones are not designed to rely solely on precision and destructive power, but rather to deplete the adversary’s defense systems and impose an unsustainable burden on their budgets. Iran’s drone attacks can be sustained for much longer periods because they are 10 to 20 times more cost-effective than the enemy’s advanced missile defense systems.

A simple calculation vividly illustrates this disparity: launching 100 drones costs the aggressor approximately US$2 million. Conversely, a nation defending its interests must spend an astronomical sum, potentially up to US$200 million, to fire sophisticated missiles to intercept those drones—regardless of the actual damage they might inflict.

Drones also possess other significant advantages: their slow speed and low altitude flight paths make them inherently difficult for radar systems to detect. Moreover, launching a large number of drones simultaneously can overwhelm air defense systems, which in some instances, may render them incapable of intercepting every incoming threat.

The devastating attack on Saudi Aramco oil facilities in 2019 vividly demonstrated the effectiveness of this capability; U.S. defense systems notably failed to intercept the Iranian-made drones. While the Houthi group claimed responsibility for the assault, many observers widely believe these drones were launched from either Iranian or Iraqi territory.

The attack on the Aramco facilities resulted in an estimated tens of billions of dollars in losses. Yet, the cost of manufacturing and launching the attacking drones amounted to only a few million dollars. This immense cost disparity is rapidly emerging as a decisive factor determining victory and defeat in modern drone warfare.

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